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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of individual choice that does not assume completeness of the
decision maker's preferences. The model helps explain in a natural way, and within a unied
framework of choice in the presence of preference-incomparable options, three distinct behavioural
phenomena: the asymmetric dominance/attraction eect, choice deferral and status quo bias. A
decision maker who follows the decision rule featured in the model chooses an alternative from
a menu if it is totally preference-undominated in that menu and at the same time is also par-
tially preference-dominant. In situations where the decision maker's preferences are complete the
model delivers strict utility maximisation.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a model of individual choice that does not assume completeness of
the decision maker's preferences. The model helps explain in a natural way, and within a
unied framework of choice in the presence of preference-incomparable options, three distinct
behavioural phenomena: the asymmetric dominance/attraction eect, choice deferral and
status quo bias.
The attraction eect concerns choice over multi-attribute alternatives and was originally
reported by Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982). It comes about in two stages. In the rst stage
the decision maker is faced with the problem of choosing between two options, with each one
dominating the other in some attribute. In the second stage the decision maker is presented
with a menu that includes the original two options and a third one. This third option is
dominated in all attributes by one of the original two alternatives (the \target" option) but
neither dominates the other alternative nor is it dominated by it. The attraction eect is
the observation that the choice probability of the asymmetrically dominant \target" option
is signicantly higher in the second, expanded menu where a \decoy" is present than in the
smaller one where such a decoy is absent.
The introspectively familiar phenomenon of choice deferral (or choice avoidance) was de-
scribed by Shar, Simonson and Tversky (1993) as the occurrence of \situations in which
people (...) do not have a compelling reason for choosing among the alternatives and, as a re-
sult, defer the decision, perhaps indenitely." Although choice avoidance/deferral ultimately
translates into status quo maintenance, one must be careful not to identify it with the distinct
phenomenon of status quo bias. As dened in Anderson (2003), \status quo bias is a deci-
sion maker's inated preference for the current state of aairs." This phenomenon was rst
documented by Thaler (1980), Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988). Unlike situations where deferral takes place and in which the status quo is irrelevant
for the decision problem at hand, in situations where choice is biased towards the status quo
the latter is directly relevant in the sense that it takes the form of an alternative similar to
all others in the menu and which the decision maker actively compares with each of them.
An example where deferral is the relevant phenomenon would be that of a consumer who
avoids choice between two insurance policies and by so doing (s)he maintains the status quo
of staying uninsured. By contrast, an example where status quo bias may be taking place
would be one where the same person is facing the problem of choosing between the same
two insurance policies but now holds one of them, and ultimately chooses to keep it.
The basic idea in the model that we propose in this paper to explain these phenomena is
that a decision maker nds an alternative to be choosable in a menu if it is not dispreferred
by any other feasible alternative and at the same time is preferred to at least one. It
therefore builds on a special kind of preference maximisation that features the combination
of the core rationality requirement of total undomination (TU) with the novel requirement
of partial dominance (PD).
If there is a menu where the decision maker's preferences happen to be complete, then,
since in this case a preference-undominated option is also preference-dominant, the TUPD
rule prescribes utility-maximising behaviour at that menu. Rational choice is therefore in-
cluded in the model as a special case. This property is demonstrated with novel axiomatic
characterisations of rational choice. When preferences are incomplete, on the other hand,
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there is no guarantee that every menu will include an alternative that satises both require-
ments set out by the the TUPD rule. To this end, two variants of the model are studied,
diering only in their predictions about what happens if such an alternative does not ex-
ist. The rst variant builds on the typical assumption that the decision maker must always
choose one of the feasible options, and predicts that in this case all feasible alternatives are
choosable. By contrast, the second variant of the model is permissive of choice deferral and
predicts that if the decision maker is unable to nd a feasible option that satises both the
TU and PD requirements, then she chooses nothing.
The typical ndings on the attraction eect are explained in a simple way by the rst
variant of the model in the special case where preferences coincide with the usual coordinate-
(attribute-)dominance partial ordering: The decision maker chooses either of the two alter-
natives in the rst menu because she is unable to compare them, and chooses only the
unique partially dominant alternative in the second menu. Moreover, the strengthening of
the attraction eect as a result of choice deferral in pure-conict menus that was reported in
Dhar and Simonson (2003) are also both explained deterministically by the second variant
of the model.
Finally, once the domain is expanded to include decision problems with a relevant status
quo along the lines suggested by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2010), then, in addition to the
above two variants of the baseline model that apply to problems without such a status
quo, a special application of the TUPD procedure can easily incorporate the well-known
(Bewley, 1986/2002; Mandler, 2004) decision rule for problems with a relevant status quo,
according to which the decision maker maintains the latter unless a feasible alternative that
is preferred to it is found. In such an event, the agent abandons the status quo for one of the
better options that is also no worse than anything else feasible. Evidently, in the case where
this choice rule is coupled with the second variant of the baseline TUPD procedure that is
permissive of deferral, the result is a unied model of choice that explains deferral, status
quo bias and (the strengthening of) the attraction eect by attributing their occurrence to
the presence of incomparable options.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation, discusses at length
our proposed approach to model choice deferral (i.e. let the empty set be the optimal set
in such cases) and reminds the reader of some key background results that are of relevance
to this paper, thereby making the connection between the proposed theory and the existing
ones more transparent. Section 3 introduces and discusses the basic axioms, lays out the
two variants of the baseline TUPD model and analyses the behavioural implications associ-
ated with each of them. In section 4 the choice domain and the basic axioms are suitably
augmented and the two variants of the TUPD choice rule are extended in the way outlined
above to also account for status quo bias. Section 5 compares the paper's ndings with
those in existing related work. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We name our decision maker Eve. The grand set of all alternatives that Eve may be presented
with is denoted X and is assumed nite. The collection of menus of alternatives drawn from
X is denoted M. For simplicity, we assume throughout that M includes all nonempty
subsets of X (with suitable adjustments all results go through without this assumption).
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Eve's preferences on X are captured by the binary relation . When x  y is the case it is
understood, as usual, that x is preferred to y, but we will occasionally also write that y is
dispreferred to x. The notation x  y is used when it is understood that x is not preferred
to y.
Eve's choice behaviour is described by a choice correspondence C : M  X, which is
a mapping satisfying C(A)  A for all A 2 M. Although the literature almost always
takes nonempty-valuedness to be a dening characteristic of a choice correspondence, one
notes that since the empty set is a subset of every set, the above denition does not a priori
restrict C to be nonempty-valued. Moreover, nonempty-valuedness imposes the nontrivial
behavioural restriction that Eve is able to nd a choosable option in every menu. For this
reason and the ones discussed just below, it will be treated as an explicit axiom in this paper:
Decisiveness (DEC)
If A 2M, then C(A) 6= ;.
Since its original conception by Samuelson (1938), the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefer-
ence (WARP) is generally accepted as the most fundamental postulate of choice consistency.
According to an intuitive statement of WARP that is relevant in the present context, if some
alternative x is chosen over another alternative y in an arbitrary menu, then y is never choos-
able in a menu where x is feasible. This statement can be formally written in the following
familiar form:
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)
If x 2 C(A), y 2 A n C(A) and x 2 B, then y 62 C(B).
Having reminded the reader of WARP's content, let us now go back to the discussion of
the DEC axiom. An argument against letting C be possibly empty-valued in order to capture
choice-avoidant behaviour is to introduce a special option, call it n, which will be feasible in
every menu and which will be uniquely assigned by the choice correspondence whenever it is
understood that Eve chooses none of the other, \real" feasible options. We claim, however,
that when such behaviour has its roots in preference-incompleteness, following this approach
can be misleading.
To illustrate with an example, imagine that Eve: a) prefers w to x and y; b) can't compare
w to z; c) chooses something from a menu if and only if it is preferred to all others in that
menu. In this case, w is chosen over n in fw; x; y; ng and n is chosen over w in fw; z; ng.
This is clearly a violation of WARP. Yet, Eve's behaviour is perfectly consistent with strict
maximisation of her incomplete preferences. Why is it then that a WARP violation comes
about? The reason is that once C is assumed nonempty-valued, n is treated by WARP just
like any other alternative. This would be perfectly reasonable if deferral was due to the
undesirability of some of the other alternatives, and if Eve also had no diculty ordering all
options (including n) according to her preferences. In such a case, n would be comparable
with all alternatives and it would set a \choosability" threshold: if a feasible alternative
better than n exists, Eve chooses something, otherwise she chooses nothing, i.e. n. In such
a case one would indeed expect WARP to be operational in choices that involve n too.
When deferral is caused by incompleteness, however, it doesn't seem to be the case that by
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choosing n from a menu Eve has actually compared it with all other options in that menu
and has found it preferable to them. Utilising the empty set instead of the explicit no-choice
alternative n for this purpose allows for the consistency restrictions to be applicable only
when Eve does actually choose and therefore respects her possible cautiousness in choosing
that follows from the incompleteness of her preferences.
Moving on to the behavioural implications of the above restrictions on a choice correspon-
dence, it is well-known since Arrow (1959) that, in the current abstract choice framework,
an individual's choice behaviour is a utility-maximising one if and only if it is consistent
with both WARP and DEC.1 For comparison purposes it will be useful to state this result
in the following way (Kreps, 1988):
Proposition 1 (Arrow)
A choice correspondence C : M  X satises DEC and WARP if and only if there exists
an asymmetric and negatively transitive relation  on X such that, for all A 2M
C(A) = fx 2 A : y  x for all y 2 Ag: (1)
Of course, if  is asymmetric and negatively transitive and one denes the relation 
by x  y if x  y and y  x, then the relation that comes about by joining  and  is a
weak order. Thus, when there are multiple choosable alternatives in a menu, the natural
interpretation suggested by this model is that Eve is indierent between them.
The choice rule set out in (1), however, obviously goes through even when  is not the
asymmetric part of a weak order and where indierence can therefore not be aorded. In
particular, it may be that Eve's psychological primitive is a severely incomplete strict pref-
erence relation, which is nevertheless internally consistent in the sense that it contains no
cycles. This more general model has also been studied in the literature and, as Schwartz
(1976) showed, it is characterised by the following two well-known axioms, both of which
are implied by WARP when DEC is assumed.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
If x 2 C(A), B  A and x 2 B, then x 2 C(B).
Expansion (EXP)
If x 2 C(A1); : : : ; C(Ak), then x 2 C(
Sk
i=1Ai).
As is evident, the former axiom imposes consistency restrictions across decision problems
that involve moving from a large menu where one alternative is choosable to a smaller menu
where the same alternative is still feasible. The latter axiom, on the other hand, imposes
restrictions in the opposite direction. The behaviour characterised by these two axioms
together with DEC is the one outlined above and formally stated below:
1Even though the role of DEC in this classic result is generally ignored, it should be emphasized that it is crucial. See
Gerasimou (2012) for more details and for a generalisation of this result that comes about when DEC is not assumed.
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Proposition 2 (Schwartz)
A choice correspondence C :M X satises DEC, EXP and IIA if and only if there exists
an acyclic relation  on X such that, for all A 2M
C(A) = fx 2 A : y  x for all y 2 Ag: (2)
One could think of Proposition 2 as the canonical model of choice with incomplete prefer-
ences.2 The model has considerable normative appeal, taking into account the incomplete-
ness (and, in fact, also the intransitivity) of the agent's preferences. However, the choice
pattern that lies behind the attraction eect is outside this model's reach. Indeed, when
faced with the problem of choosing between multi-attribute options x and y where each op-
tion dominates the other in some attribute, a decision maker whose preferences are captured
by the usual partial ordering (dened on attribute space) would be unable to compare x and
y. Modeled deterministically according to the Schwartz model, the choice behaviour of such
a decision maker would dictate C(fx; yg) = fx; yg, which is a good proxy for the typical
experimental ndings of more or less equal choice probabilities for x and y in this problem.
Yet, in the menu where the feasible alternatives are x, y and a third option y0 (which is
a \decoy" for y in the sense that it is worse than y in all attributes but both better and
worse than x in some attribute), Schwartz's model would still predict C(fx; y; y0g) = fx; yg.
This prediction, however, is at odds with the well-established empirical fact that the choice
probability of y is signicantly higher in this menu compared to the original two-element one
where this probability was close to a half, and which would suggest that C(fx; y; y0g) = y is a
more accurate way of describing such behaviour. It will be shown below that a modication
of Schwartz's basic model is able to generate this choice pattern in a simple and intuitive
way.
3 Totally Undominated & Partially Dominant Choice
We set out the axioms that form the core of the models that follow. All axioms have a
normative avour in the sense that the restrictions imposed by them do not force Eve to
behave in a way directly inconsistent with WARP. At the same time, they do not have the
full normative power entailed by the combination of WARP and DEC which characterizes
utility maximisation. As it will become clear below, the removal of some of the normative
restrictions imposed by this combination of axioms is justied on descriptive grounds.
Reduced WARP (ReWARP)
If C(fx; yg) = x and x 2 A, then y 62 C(A).
Although ReWARP places fewer restrictions than WARP, one could think of the two
axioms as conveying the same normative message, namely that \if x is revealed preferred
2Eliaz and Ok (2006) axiomatise a similar but richer model where the agent's strict preferences are transitive and
where indierence is also permissible and behaviourally distinguishable from incomparability. Salant and Rubinstein
(2008) provide a reinterpretation of the model (also in the case where preferences are transitive) in a novel context of
choice with frames.
5
to y, then y is not choosable in the presence of x". The dierence lies in the fact that the
former does so using a narrower denition of revealed preference than the latter. According
to this line of reasoning one would think of WARP as taking x to be revealed preferred to y if
there is any menu where x is chosen over y, and of ReWARP as doing the same only when x
is chosen over y in the menu fx; yg. Choice-based inferences concerning preference between
x and y are not aected by the presence of alternatives other than x and y in the latter
situation, whereas they potentially are in the former. On these grounds one could therefore
argue that a better indication of Eve's preference for x over y would come from knowing
that C(fx; yg) = x rather than knowing that there is some menu A where x is choosable
and y is not. As far as the practical matters of relaxing WARP in this way are concerned,
one observes that the restrictions imposed by ReWARP are compatible with the attraction
eect, since, unlike WARP, they are permissive of the choice pattern C(fx; y; y0g) = y and
C(fx; yg) = fx; yg.3
Weak Partial Contraction (WPC)
If x 2 C(A) and C(A)  A, then x = C(B) for some B  A such that jBj > 1.
Consider a menu A where an alternative x is choosable and not everything in the menu
is. WPC states that there should be some smaller menu where x is the only choosable
option. Natural candidates where one might expect this to be true are the binary menus
consisting of x and each of the alternatives that are rejected in A. Yet, the axiom could
also be satised even in non-binary menus that contain a single choosable alternative, with-
out this alternative being the unique choosable one in all binary submenus. An example
where this is true is the choice pattern that generates the attraction eect, where one has
C(fx; y; y0g) = y, C(fy; y0g) = y and C(fx; yg) = fx; yg.
Weak Expansion (WEXP)
If C(A1) = x and, for i  2, either x 2 C(Ai) or C(Si) = ; for all Si  Ai such that x 2 Si
and jSij > 1, then x 2 C(
Sk
i=1Ai).
WEXP is similar to EXP but obviously weaker when DEC is also assumed. This is so
due to the additional requirement that x must be the unique optimal choice in at least one
of the menus A1; : : : ; Ak, in addition to being choosable in all others, before it is considered
choosable in the menu that comes about by merging all the Ais. The other novel compo-
nent of the axiom becomes operational when DEC is not in force. In this case the original
requirement of x being the unique choosable option in some menu remains, but now x can
still be choosable in the expanded menu even if it is not choosable in any of the other Ais,
provided that nothing is chosen in all these Ais and from all their submenus that contain
x. Intuitively, even though x is not choosable in some Ais, it is true that nothing in these
menus is chosen over x either. As such, these Ais are \neutral" when it comes to assessing
the optimality of x in the expanded menu. The axiom states that the dominance of x in at
least one of the components of the large menu provides sucient reason for it to be choosable
3Under DEC, ReWARP is equivalent to Sen's (1977) Property 2, which states that if x 2 C(A) and y 2 A, then
x 2 C(fx; yg). Sen introduced this axiom as a weakening of Property , which is a synonym for IIA. However, ReWARP
and 2 are logically distinct if DEC is not assumed. By contrast, ReWARP is weaker than WARP whether DEC is
assumed or not.
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there, even in the face of such neutral behaviour in the other components of the large menu.
Proposition 3
A choice correspondence C : M  X satises DEC, ReWARP, WEXP and WPC if and
only if there exists an acyclic relation  on X such that, for all A 2M,
C(A) = A () x  y and y  x for all x; y 2 A (3a)
C(A)  A () C(A) =
8<:
z  x for all z 2 A
x 2M : and
x  y for some y 2 A
9=; (3b)
This model portrays Eve as a decision maker who operates procedurally and yet with a
single incomplete and acyclic preference relation describing her tastes.4 Her actions depend
on whether the menu that she is presented with contains alternatives that are preference-
ranked or not. If not, then all alternatives in the menu are mutually incomparable and,
since the assumption that she always chooses something is built in the model by means of
DEC, this fact leads to all feasible alternatives being choosable. This feature of the model is
captured by (3a) and is shared with the two baseline models of rational choice, Propositions
1 and 2.
If, however, a preference comparison between some alternatives in the menu does exist,
then Eve proceeds in two steps. First, she elicits those options in the menu that are un-
dominated according to her preferences. In view of the acyclicity of , this set is nonempty.
Then, she searches within this smaller set of alternatives for ones that also dominate some
other feasible options. Since it was assumed that there is at least one preference comparison
in the menu, this set is also nonempty. Eve's choice is an element of this smaller set. This
reasoning is captured by (3b).
We will refer to both a choice correspondence C that is characterized by the axioms of
Proposition 3 and to the alternatives that are optimal according to such a correspondence
as totally undominated and partially dominant (TUPD). Also, if C is a TUPD choice cor-
respondence and  is the preference relation that is associated with it in the sense of (3a)
and (3b), then we will say that  induces or generates C.
Similar to the model that builds on (2), the alternatives declared optimal by a TUPD
choice correspondence C are not preferred in general to those that are rejected by C. Unlike
(2), however, this is so even in those menus where C is single-valued. Furthermore, again
similar to (2), a TUPD C includes the model of a rational choice single-valued function as
a special case when the generating preference relation is complete. Indeed, if  is complete,
then the situation described in (3a) is ruled out from the outset (except at singleton menus),
whereas for every menu A, an option x 2 A satises (3b) if and only if it is in fact preferred
to all other options in A. The exact way in which the axiomatic system of Proposition 3
must be strengthened for it to deliver this model is studied below.
4The classic reference for two-stage choice procedures (based on two distinct, incomplete and possibly cyclic prefer-
ence relations) in abstract choice theory is Manzini and Mariotti (2007).
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A somewhat surprising feature of the TUPD procedure is that it predicts less consistency
in Eve's cross-menu behaviour than the TU procedure of Proposition 2, even though she
is actually portrayed as seeking more reasons than mere preference-undomination in the
TUPD model before considering an alternative to be choosable in any given menu. More
specically, despite the fact that Eve will never choose a dominated option by following (3),
her choices across menus may violate the IIA axiom. For example, suppose w; x; y; z are
alternatives for which w  x, y  z and no comparison is possible in all other pairs derived
from this four-element set. Since w and z are undominated in the menu fw; x; y; zg and both
dominate something there, C(fw; x; y; zg) = fw; zg. Now consider the menu fw; y; zg. Since
w is merely undominated here, whereas y is still both undominated and partially dominant,
C(fw; y; zg) = y.
Despite its normative \shortcomings", it is straightforward that the TUPD choice corre-
spondence explains the classic attraction eect in a simple way in the special case where the
preference relation inducing it is the asymmetric part of the usual, coordinate-wise domi-
nance partial ordering. Of course, the model is general enough to explain \idiosyncratic"
attraction eects that are based on more subjective dominance relations. For instance, if
Eve's incomplete preferences dier from those captured by the usual partial ordering, then
there are alternatives x, y and z where x and y and also x and z are incomparable while
x is preferred to z, where preference is not necessarily identied with attribute dominance.
According to the model, y is the unique choosable option in the menu fx; y; zg.
A particularly desirable property of the TUPD choice procedure is its robustness with re-
spect to the DEC axiom. In a decision environment where her preferences are possibly incom-
plete, the assumption that Eve is able to nd a choosable option in every menu may be too
strong. As mentioned above, a large body of experimental work in psychology and consumer
research (Tversky and Shar, 1992; Greenleaf and Lehmann, 1995; Luce, 1998) has demon-
strated that people are very often unable to choose one of the available alternatives when
decision conict is present, because the tradeos involved may be severe enough that prevent
them from nding an option whose choice can be justied (Shar, Simonson, and Tversky,
1993). Moreover, for the particular case of the attraction eect the experimental ndings
in Dhar and Simonson (2003) suggest that the eect (as measured by the dierence in the
choice probabilities of the target option before and after the introduction of the decoy) be-
comes stronger when subjects are not forced to choose than when they are forced to do so.
A candidate explanation for this is precisely the fact that many subjects choose nothing
from the pure-conict menu where the decoy is absent and at the same time most subjects
choose the option that dominates the decoy when the latter is introduced.
To explain this behaviour we will modify the baseline model of Proposition 3 by removing
DEC and by strengthening WPC in the following way:
Strict Partial Contraction (SPC)
If x 2 C(A), then x = C(B) for some B  A such that jBj > 1.
While WPC states that for x to be the only choosable option in a submenu of A it
suces that x be choosable in A and that something in A be rejected, according to SPC
it is sucient that x be merely choosable in A for the conclusion to follow. Although the
axiom is now stronger, it is descriptively relevant in situations where choice is not forced and
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deferral is permissible. For instance, the behaviour reported in Dhar and Simonson (2003)
would be best captured in this context by setting C(fx; y; y0g) = y and C(fx; yg) = ;. This
choice pattern is consistent with SPC.
Proposition 4
A choice correspondence C : M  X satises ReWARP, SPC and WEXP if and only if
there exists an asymmetric relation  on X such that, for all A 2M with jAj > 1,
C(A) =
8<:
z  x for all z 2 A
x 2M : and
x  y for some y 2 A.
9=; (4)
In Proposition 4 Eve is portrayed as a cautious decision maker who chooses nothing from
a menu unless she can nd a feasible option that meets the TUPD criterion. The fact that
the relation  here is merely asymmetric (and hence possibly cyclic) implies that, in addition
to incomparability, inconsistency too is a potential source of deferral. Indeed, the presence
of a preference cycle causes failure of meeting the TU requirement, while, as before, in the
event of an absence of preference comparisons it is the PD condition that fails to be met.
Whether one thinks of the possibly cyclic nature of Eve's preferences here as a virtue or an
anomaly of the model, it is worth mentioning that acyclicity of these preferences is restored
in the augmented model presented in the next section, without this aecting in any way
Eve's ability to defer choice.
It is clear that the axiomatic system of Proposition 4 is neither stronger nor weaker than
that of Proposition 3. As the following novel characterization of rational choice demon-
strates, however, both results deliver strict utility maximisation (i.e. without indierence
ties) as a special case.
Proposition 5
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) C :M X satises DEC, ReWARP and SPC;
(b) C :M X satises DEC, WARP and SPC;
(c) C :M X satises DEC, WARP and single-valuedness;
(d) There exists a strict linear order  on X such that, for all A 2M,
C(A) = fx 2 A : y  x for all y 2 Ag: (5)
The equivalence between statements (c) and (d) in Proposition 5 is well-known. The
novelty of the result lies in the fact that it also proves that these and the remaining state-
ments are also equivalent. More specically, the equivalence between (a) and (d) shows in
a transparent way how the TUPD procedure reduces to rational choice. As a novel charac-
terisation of rational choice, it is also of independent interest. The equivalence between (b)
and (c) on the other hand identies an axiom (i.e. SPC) which is satised in addition to
DEC and WARP if and only if the benchmark model of a rational choice correspondence in
Proposition 1 generates unique predictions.
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4 Expanded Domain and Status Quo Bias
As set out in the previous section, the TUPD choice procedure was shown to be able to
predict the occurrence of the attraction eect and of its strengthening when choice is not
forced by also allowing for choice deferral in situations where the menu consists of mutually
incomparable alternatives. In this section we show how the procedure can also be useful in
explaining the phenomenon of status quo bias. To this end, we expand the choice domain
in the way suggested by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2010).
As before, M will denote the collection of all menus generated from a nite grand set
X. A decision problem in the present context, however, is a pair (A; p), where A 2 M is a
menu and p is either an alternative contained in A or an object denoted by . The domain
of all problems (A; p) is denoted Z. When p 2 A, it is understood that the decision problem
(A; p) features a status quo that is relevant, in the sense that it takes the form of a \real"
feasible option, just like all others. When p =  on the other hand, we understand that
the status quo is irrelevant.5 This clearly diers from problem to problem. For instance,
owning no car and choosing nothing when presented with the problem of choosing car A or
car B corresponds to maintaining a dierent status quo than when one owns no fridge and
chooses nothing when presented with fridges C and D. Despite this fact, since all decision
problems of this kind share the feature of having a status quo that takes a dierent form
than an alternative \just like all others", it is without any loss of conceptual relevance to
use the notation  across all such problems.6
A choice correspondence is now a mapping C : Z  X that satises C(A; p)  A for
all (A; p) 2 Z. For reasons of internal consistency, C is assumed to satisfy C(A; s) 6= ;
for all (A; s) 2 Z. The interpretation for such a restriction is obvious: Unlike the case of
decision problems where doing nothing is associated with not choosing a feasible option,
doing nothing in problems where the status quo takes the form of an alternative just like all
others is obviously associated with keeping the status quo alternative. Thus, either the status
quo or some other feasible option must be chosen in such decision problems, which makes
the above requirement self-evident. Of course, this requirement does not automatically carry
over to problems (A; ) 2 Z.
The next two axioms impose exactly the same restrictions than when they were originally
introduced, but are now rewritten in a way that makes use of the current notation.
Decisiveness (DEC)
If A 2M, then C(A; ) 6= ;.
Weak Partial Contraction (WPC)
If x 2 C(A; ) and C(A; )  A, then x = C(B; ) for some B  A, jBj > 1.
Next, ReWARP is restated so as to make the axiom's restrictions applicable both in
problems without a relevant status quo, as before, but also in ones where such a status quo
5Obviously, our terminology for relevant and irrelevant status quos is conceptually entirely unrelated to the axiom
of Status Quo Irrelevance of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2010).
6Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2010), who introduced this notation, interpret  as an element not included in the grand
set X.
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does exist. These restrictions are obviously applicable across problems with the same status
quo.
ReWARP
If C(fx; yg; p) = x, x 6= p and x 2 A, then y 62 C(A; p).
A more substantial modication is due for the WEXP axiom. In its original version
it was assumed that if an alternative x is uniquely chosen from a menu and, in addition,
it is either choosable in a number of other menus or nothing is choosable in those menus
and in all submenus that contain x, then x is also choosable in the large menu that is
obtained by joining all individual ones. The axiom is now modied in two ways. First,
the menu where x must be uniquely optimal is now required to be a binary one. Second,
if all conditions are satised, then x is choosable not only in the status-quo-free problem
that features the expanded menu, but also in the problem where the same expanded menu is
involved and where the status quo is the option over which x was chosen in the binary menu.
Augmented Weak Expansion (AWEXP)
For (A1; ); : : : ; (Ak; ) 2 Z with A1 = fx; sg and A =
Sk
i=1Ai, suppose that:
1. C(A1; ) = x;
2. For i  2, either x 2 C(Ai; ) or C(Si; ) = ; for all Si  Ai such that x 2 Si and jSij > 1.
Then x 2 C(A; ) and x 2 C(A; s).7
The three axioms that are particular to decision problems with a relevant status quo are
introduced next.
Consistent Strict Inferiority (CSI)
For all x; s 2 X, C(fx; sg; ) = x if and only if C(fx; sg; s) = x.
The statement C(fx; yg; ) = x in the expanded domain carries the same interpretation
that the statement C(fx; yg) = x does in the standard domain. According to this interpre-
tation, Eve strictly prefers x to y. The rst part of the CSI axiom states that when Eve is
faced with a binary problem where the status quo is strictly inferior to the other feasible
option, then the fact that the inferior option also happens to be the status quo plays no
role and Eve never chooses it even in that case. This restriction is compatible with the
status quo bias phenomenon because the relevant experimental evidence seems to suggest
that the inated preference for the status quo comes about when neither of the two options
is considered strictly superior to the other. One typically models a situation like this with
C(fx; yg; ) = fx; yg. It should be emphasized that in such a case the CSI axiom does not
require C(fx; yg; y) = fx; yg, as the latter would indeed be at odds with status quo bias.
The second restriction imposed by CSI requires the converse to also be true, namely if
Eve chooses x over s when faced with the pair fx; sg and endowed with s, then she will also
7As far as the results that are presented in this section are concerned it is worth noting that if we impose the domain
restriction that for all A 2 M and all s 2 A it holds that (A; s) 2 Z, then this axiom's requirement that x 2 C(A; )
and x 2 C(A; s) can be reduced to x 2 C(A; s).
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choose x over s when she is faced with the same problem and neither option is the status
quo. This part of the axiom coincides with the second part of the Weak Axiom of Status
Quo Bias suggested by Masatlioglu and Ok (2010).
Status-Quo-Independent Choice (SQIC)
If x 2 C(A; s) and x 6= s, then x 2 C(A; ).
SQIC imposes the intuitive restriction that if there is a decision problem with a relevant
status quo in which some feasible option other than the status quo is choosable, then that
option must also be choosable in the same decision problem where there is no status quo.
This axiom is normatively appealing. At the same time, it does not seem to run against
existing experimental evidence or intuition.
Firm Status Quo Bias (FSQB)
If x; s 2 A and x 6= C(fx; sg; s), then x 62 C(A; s).
Consider a binary decision problem where the menu is fx; sg and s is the status quo. If x
is not chosen over s in this problem, then, reasoning in the way discussed above, one could
interpret this as evidence that x is not considered superior to s. Consistent with the experi-
mental evidence on status quo bias, FSQB requires that, in such a case, x be non-choosable
in a decision problem where a larger menu A that includes both x and s is involved and
where s is the status quo.
Proposition 6
A choice correspondence C : Z  X satises AWEXP, CSI, DEC, FSQB, ReWARP, SQIC
and WPC if and only if there exists an acyclic relation  on X such that for all A 2M
C(A; ) = A () x  y and y  x for all x; y 2 A (6a)
C(A; )  A () C(A; ) =
8<:
z  x for all z 2 A
x 2M : and
x  y for some y 2 A
9=; (6b)
C(A; s) 6= s () C(A; s) =
8<:
z  x for all z 2 A
x 2M : and
x  s
9=; (6c)
C(A; s) = s () z  s for all z 2 A: (6d)
The rst two elements of this model, (6a) and (6b), are identical to (3a) and (3b) in
the baseline TUPD procedure and dictate Eve's behaviour in decision problems where
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the status quo is irrelevant. The latter two elements of the model, (6c) and (6d), for-
malize the incomplete-preference-based explanation of status quo bias that was referred
to by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) as the Simon-Bewley procedure (Simon, 1955; Bewley,
1986/2002). This procedure was described by Mandler (2004) in the following way: \Agents
with incomplete preferences maintain the status quo when they follow the simple rule of re-
fusing to trade their endowment for unranked bundles and waiting until oered an alternative
that is ranked superior".
Clearly, Proposition 6 provides a model that explains asymmetric dominance and status
quo bias in a natural way within a unied framework of choice with incomplete preferences.
The link between (6b) and (6c) is of particular interest. It shows that Eve's decision to
abandon the status quo follows a special application of the TUPD procedure: In particular,
for it to be choosable, a feasible alternative other than the status quo must be universally
undominated and must also be partially dominant, not with respect to some arbitrary fea-
sible alternative, but rather with respect to the status quo. Thus, the model features a
reference-dependent, special application of the TUPD procedure when it comes to the deci-
sion of giving up the status quo. At the same time, status quo bias is captured by the fact
that in all problems that feature a relevant status quo the latter is uniquely chosen if and
only if it is merely undominated in the menu.
In order to make this expanded model permissive of choice deferral one need only follow
the exact same steps that were taken previously, i.e. remove the DEC axiom and strengthen
WPC with SPC:
Strict Partial Contraction (SPC)
If x 2 C(A; ), then there exists B  A, jBj > 1, such that x = C(B; ).
Proposition 7
A choice correspondence C : Z  X satises AWEXP, CSI, FSQB, ReWARP, SPC and
SQIC if and only if there exists an acyclic relation  on X such that, for all A 2 M and
s 2 X,
C(A; ) =
8<:
z  x for all z 2 A
x 2M : and
x  y for some y 2 A
9=; (7a)
C(A; s) 6= s () C(A; s) =
8<:
z  x for all z 2 A
x 2M : and
x  s
9=; (7b)
C(A; s) = s () z  s for all z 2 A (7c)
Proposition 7 presents a further augemented model where asymmetric dominance, defer-
ral and status quo bias can all be captured and are all attributed to the incompleteness of
Eve's preferences. The parts that explain status quo bias, (7b) and (7c), remain exactly the
same as in Proposition 6 and govern Eve's behaviour when she is faced with problems that
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have a relevant status quo. Her behaviour in decision problems without such a status quo
on the other hand is guided by the variant of the TUPD procedure that allows for deferral
and which was introduced in Proposition 4. Notably, Eve's preferences here are no longer
merely asymmetric but have become acyclic. This is due to an interaction of the full domain
assumption with ReWARP, CSI and the fact that C(A; s) 6= ; for all (A; s) 2 Z with s 2 A.
For more details the reader is referred to the proof in the Appendix.
Our last result identies the way in which the model delivers rational choice as a spe-
cial case when preferences are complete, irrespective of whether the decision problem is one
where the status quo is relevant or not.
Proposition 8
The following statements are equivalent:
1. C : Z  X satises CSI, DEC, ReWARP, SPC and SQIC.
2. There exists a strict linear order  on X such that, for all (A; p) 2 Z
C(A; p) = fx 2 A : y  x for all y 2 Ag: (8)
In addition to DEC, ReWARP and SPC that characterise strict utility maximisation
in the standard domain (Proposition 5), Proposition 8 shows that CSI and SQIC are the
key axioms relating behaviour in problems with and without a relevant status quo that are
necessary and sucient for Eve to be a strict utility maximiser in both types of problems.
In such a case, of course, Eve is no longer susceptible to either the attraction eect or the
phenomena of choice deferral and status quo bias.
5 Related Literature
We start by discussing the existing theoretical literature on the attraction eect. We note
from the outset that despite the many models that can explain this eect, to our knowledge
the only one that is also robust to the nonempty-valuedness assumption and can there-
fore explain the strengthening of the eect when choice is not forced is the TUPD model.
Lombardi (2009) proposed a two-stage choice procedure which, like the one in this paper,
builds on a single incomplete and acyclic preference relation and explains the attraction
eect. The decision maker in his model chooses one of the feasible undominated options for
which the set of worse alternatives in the given menu is not a proper subset of the same
set corresponding to some other undominated option. For a given preference relation, an
alternative that is choosable in Lombardi's model is also choosable in the TUPD model but
the converse is not generally true.
Following a dierent approach, de Clippel and Eliaz (2012) explain the phenomenon with
a model of intrapersonal bargaining between the agent's two selves. In their model, the
individual assigns an ordered pair of \scores" to each alternative. The rst (second) score
is the number of feasible options that are worse than the given option according to the
complete preferences of the rst (second) self. the agent chooses one of the options with the
largest minimum score. This model does not subsume rational choice, as one of its necessary
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conditions (Existence of a Compromise) predicts that, given any three alternatives with the
property that both options are choosable in each of the three possible pairs, there is a unique
choosable option in the menu consisting of all three alternatives (which violates WARP).
The model, however, was also shown to be able to accommodate the compromise eect
(Simonson, 1989).
Another model that explains the attraction eect is due to Ok, Ortoleva and Riela
(2010). This model features reference-dependent choice and the main idea behind it is
that a feasible alternative may act as a reference point that favors those alternatives that
dominate it. Once this set of dominating options is determined, the decision maker chooses
among the elements of this set that maximise a real-valued function. In another theory of
bounded-rational behaviour, Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) studied a decision
maker who does not generally consider all feasible alternatives due to attention constraints.
Letting y0 be a decoy for alternative y, their model accommodates choice behaviour where
C(fx; yg) = x and C(fx; y; y0g) = y, which the authors interpret as another instance of the
attraction eect.8 Natenzon (2011) explains asymmetric dominance with a similarity-based
model of learning and stochastic choice.
As far as deferral is concerned, the idea that it can be modeled with an empty optimal
set goes back to at least Hurwicz (1986). Clark (1995) argued that WARP rationality is not
incompatible with choice deferral modeled in this way, without, however, characterizing a
choice procedure that features such behaviour. This task is carried out in Gerasimou (2012)
and the result provided there includes Arrow's theorem (Proposition 1 above) as a special
case when preferences are complete. Gaertner and Xu (2004) also model an individual who
occasionally chooses nothing by letting the empty set describe behaviour in such cases, but
the sources of choice avoidance in their theory are procedural aspects behind the feasibility of
some alternatives and not preference incompleteness. Buturak and Evren (2010) investigate
preference for exibility as an explanation of choice deferral.
Concerning status quo bias and incomplete preferences, it was demonstrated in Mandler
(2004) that a decision maker who follows the choice procedure that was formally embedded
in Propositions 6 and 7 above cannot be led to exploitations of the money-pump kind.9
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2010) provided the rst axiomatic treatment of the phenomenon
within the framework of multi-(weak)-utility representations of the agent's incomplete pref-
erences, demonstrating also its compatibility with rational behaviour. Our model (both
Propositions 6 and 7) is logically distinct from theirs. In terms of dierences in behavioural
predictions, their model (in particular, Theorem 3 in Masatlioglu and Ok, 2010) portrays an
agent who never defers choice and is generally immune to the attraction eect in problems
without a status quo. In problems with a status quo, the two models coincide in the predic-
tion that unless something better than the status quo is feasible, the agent keeps the latter.
In those cases where at least one better option exists, however, the two models' predictions
are generally distinct.10
Dean (2008) investigated the role of complexity (as captured by the size of a menu) in
status quo bias. In contrast to Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2010) who build on WARP, Dean
8The model by Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella (2010) also captures this IIA-inconsistent choice pattern.
9Further discussion on the possible exploitation of an agent with incomplete preferences is given in Mandler (2009)
and Danan (2010).
10In such cases the model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2010) predicts that the agent chooses one of the options for which
the sum of all weak utilities is maximised. Thus, an option may exist that is incomparable to these alternatives and
which may not be choosable even though it is strictly better than the status quo and worse than no other alternative.
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(2008), among other things, relaxes WARP by requiring it to hold only in problems without a
status quo. Apesteguia and Ballester (2009) studied status quo bias and reference-dependent
choice in a model where behaviour is rationalized by a collection of binary relations, one for
each possible reference point. An alternative approach based on maximisation of a strict
linear ordering is followed in Apesteguia and Ballester (2012). Finally, Ortoleva (2010)
studied status quo bias in the context of choice under uncertainty, showing that the presence
of a status quo can make the decision maker become more ambiguity averse compared to
cases where a status quo is absent.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we showed that the phenomena of asymmetric dominance, choice deferral and
status quo bias can be explained in a natural way within a unied framework of choice with
incomplete preferences. The novel element in the choice procedure that we proposed for
this purpose is the combination of the criteria of total preference undomination and partial
preference dominance. Although the proposed model is one of bounded-rational choice, the
sole source of bounded rationality is the incompleteness of the decision maker's preferences.
As such, in decision problems where the agent's preferences over the feasible alternatives
happen to be complete, the model prescribes and predicts utility-maximising behaviour.
The theoretical framework developed in this paper is therefore able to explain the above
three phenomena with minimal deviations from fully rational behaviour.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose there exists an acyclic relation  on X such that (3) holds. Let C(A) = ; for
some A 2 M. Clearly, C(A)  A. It follows then from (3b) that there is no x 2 A such
that (i) z  x for all z 2 A, and (ii) x  y for some y 2 A. Since  is acyclic, there exists
x 2 A that satises (i). It follows then that there is no x 2 A satisfying (ii). These two
facts in turn imply that x  y and y  x for all x; y 2 A. But in this case (3a) ensures that
C(A) = A. Since A 6= ; for all A 2M, this is a contradiction. Hence, DEC is satised.
Assume that ReWARP is violated. There exist x; y 2 X and A 2 M such that
C(fx; yg) = x, x 2 A and y 2 C(A). From C(fx; yg) = x and (3b) it follows that x  y.
Since y 2 C(A) it also follows from (3a) or (3b) (if C(A) = A or C(A)  A, respectively)
that x  y. This is a contradiction.
Now let A1; : : : ; Ak 2 M be such that x = C(A1), jA1j > 1 and x 2 C(Ai) for all i  2.
Dene A :=
Sk
i=1. It is implied by (3b) and C(A1) = x that z  x for all z 2 A1 and x  y
for some y 2 A1. Moreover, x 2 C(Ai) for i  2 and (3a) or (3b) (depending on whether
C(Ai) = Ai or C(Ai)  Ai, respectively) imply z  x for all z 2 Ai, for all i = 2; : : : ; k.
Thus, z  x for all z 2 A and x  y for some y 2 A. From (3b), this implies x 2 C(A).
Hence, WEXP is satised.
Finally, let A 2 M be such that x 2 C(A) and C(A)  A. From (3b) it follows that
x  y for some y 2 A. Since fx; yg 2 M, x  y and (3b) together imply C(fx; yg) = x.
16
This proves that WPC is also satised.
Conversely, assume that DEC, ReWARP, WEXP and WPC hold. Dene the relation
 on X by x  y if C(fx; yg) = x. By denition,  is asymmetric. Suppose  is not
acyclic. There exist x1; x2; : : : ; xk 2 X such that x1  x2  : : :  xk  x1. By assumption,
B := fx1; x2; : : : ; xkg 2 M, while DEC implies C(B) 6= ;. Thus, xi 2 C(B) for some
i  k. From the -cycle above it follows that there is xj 2 B such that xj  xi, i.e.
C(fxi; xjg) = xj . This contradicts ReWARP.
Suppose A 2 M is such that x  y and y  x for all x; y 2 A. From DEC, C(A) 6= ;.
Let x 2 C(A) and C(A)  A. Repeated application of WPC shows that x  y for some
y 2 A. This is a contradiction. It holds, therefore, that C(A) = A. In the other direction,
let C(A) = A and suppose x  y for some x; y 2 A. Since y 2 C(A) by assumption, this is
a violation of ReWARP. Hence, (3a) is established.
To also establish (3b), let C(A)  A for some A 2 M. Suppose rst that x 2 C(A).
If z  x for some z 2 A, then ReWARP is violated. Let x  y for all y 2 M . WPC
implies that x = C(B) for some B  A with jBj > 1. Applying WPC repeatedly yields
x = C(fx;wg) for some w 2 A, which is equivalent to x  w. This is a contradiction. Thus,
x 2 C(A) and C(A)  A implies z  x for all z 2 A and x  y for some y 2 A. In the other
direction, suppose there is x 2 A such that z  x for all z 2 A and x  y for some y 2 A.
This implies C(fx; yg) = x for some y 2 A and, in view of DEC, x 2 C(fx; zg) for all z 2 A.
Let F := fx; yg and label all other elements in A by z1; : : : ; zk. Also, let Gi := fx; zig. Since
x = C(F ), x 2 Tki=1C(Gi) and Ski=1Gi [ F = A, it follows from WEXP that x 2 C(A).
Suppose, nally, that C(A) = A. Then y 2 C(A), x 2 A and C(fx; yg) = x contradicts
ReWARP. Hence, C(A)  A. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Suppose there is an asymmetric relation  on X such that (4) holds. Let x; y 2 X be
such that C(fx; yg) = x and let x 2 A and y 2 C(A). It follows from C(fx; yg) = x and
(4) that x  y. From y 2 C(A) and (4) it also holds that x  y, a contradiction. Hence,
ReWARP is satised. Next, let w 2 C(B) for some B 2M. It is implied by (4) that w  y
for some y 2 B, and therefore, again from (4), C(fw; yg) = w. Thus, SPC is satised too.
Now let A1 be such that jA1j > 1 and x = C(A1), and consider a collection A2; : : : ; Ak 2
M. Suppose that, for all i = 2; : : : ; k, either x 2 C(Ai) or C(Si) = ; for all Si  Ai such
that jSij > 1 and x 2 Si. In view of (4), it holds in both cases that z  x for all z 2 Ai and
all i = 2; : : : ; k. Moreover, (4) also implies z  x for all z 2 A1 and x  y for some y 2 A1.
Let A :=
Sk
i=1Ai. The above implies z  x for all z 2 A and x  y for some y 2 A. It
follows then from 4) that x 2 C(A). This shows that WEXP is satised too.
Conversely, suppose C obeys WEXP, SPC and ReWARP. Again, dene the asymmetric
relation  on X by x  y if C(fx; yg) = x. It follows from ReWARP that x 2 C(A) implies
z  x for all y 2 A. It also follows from repeated application of SPC that x 2 C(A) implies
x  y for some y 2 A. In the other direction, suppose that x 2 A is such that z  x for all
z 2 A and x  y for some y 2 A. It holds that C(fx; yg) = x for some y 2 A and, in view
of SPC, either C(fx; zg) = x or C(fx; zg) = ; for all other z 2 A. Label all such z 2 A
as z1; : : : ; zk and let F := fx; yg and Gi := fx; zig, i  k. Since C(F ) = x, x = C(Gi) or
C(Gi) = ; for all i  k, and A :=
Sk
i=1Gi [F , it is implied by WEXP that x 2 C(A). This
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establishes (4). 
Proof of Proposition 5:
(a) =) (b): Suppose DEC, SPC and ReWARP are satised and WARP is not. Then,
x 2 C(A), y 2 A n C(A), y 2 C(B) and x 2 B for some x; y 2 X and A;B 2 M. Consider
fx; yg 2 M. DEC and SPC imply C(fx; yg) = x or C(fx; yg) = y. In the former case
the postulate y 2 C(B) and x 2 B is contradicted, whereas in the latter case the postulate
x 2 C(A) and y 2 A is contradicted.
(b) =) (c): Suppose DEC, SPC and WARP are satised and that C is not single-
valued. There exists A 2 M such that x; y 2 C(A) for some distinct x; y 2 A. As before,
from DEC and SPC we have C(fx; yg) = x or C(fx; yg) = y. In view of ReWARP, either
case contradicts the postulate x; y 2 C(A).
(c) =) (d): The argument here is well-known.
(d) =) (a): Suppose C satises (5) and let  be the strict linear order with which it
does so. Let C violate DEC. There exists A 2 M such that C(A) = ;. Since  is a strict
linear order, there is a unique x 2 A such that y  x for all y 2 A. It follows from (5) that
C(A) = x, a contradiction. Suppose now that C violates ReWARP. There exist x; y 2 X
and A 2 M such that C(fx; yg) = x, x 2 A and y 2 C(A). Since  is a strict linear order
and (5) holds, C(fx; yg) = x implies x  y, while x 2 A and y 2 C(A) implies x  y, a
contradiction. Finally, let x 2 C(A) for some A 2 M. Since  is a strict linear order and
(5) holds, we have x  y for all y 2 A, and therefore C(fx; yg) = x for all such y. This
shows that SPC is also obeyed by C.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Suppose there is an acyclic relation  on X such that (6a){(6d) hold. The relevant
argument in the proof of Proposition 3 shows that (6a), (6b) and acyclicity of  together
imply DEC. Similarly, the relevant arguments in that proof also show that (6a) and (6b)
imply WPC and ReWARP for p = .
Now consider the case of ReWARP when p 6= . If the axiom is violated, there exist
x; s 2 X and A 2 M such that C(fx; sg; s) = x and s 2 C(A; s). It follows from (6c) and
C(fx; sg; s) = x that x  s. It also follows from (6d) and s 2 C(A; s) that x  s. This is a
contradiction.
Next, let A1; A2; : : : ; Ak 2 Z be such that A1 = fx; sg, x = C(A1; ) and x 2 C(Ai; )
for all i = 2; : : : ; k. The former postulate and (6b) together imply x  s. The latter
postulate and (6b) together imply z  x for all z 2 Ai and all i = 2; : : : ; k. Thus, z  x
for all z 2 Ski=1Ai := A and x  s. In view of (6b) and (6c) this implies x 2 C(A; ) and
x 2 C(A; s) respectively, which shows that AWEXP is also satised.
Now consider (A; s) 2 Z and suppose x 2 C(A; s) for some x 6= s. Since it follows from
(6c) that x  s, it also follows from (6c) that C(fx; sg; s) = x. This shows that FSQI
(specically, its contrapositive) is satised. Moreover, in view of (6c), x 2 C(A; s) and x 6= s
also implies z  x for all z 2 A. It follows then from (6b) that x 2 C(A; ) too, which proves
that SQIC is also satised.
Finally, to show that C obeys CSI let C(fx; sg; s) = x. From (6c), this implies x  s,
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which, in view of (6b) also implies C(fx; sg; ) = x. Conversely, suppose C(fx; sg; ) = x.
From (6b), x  s. It is implied by (6c) that C(fx; sg; s) = x too.
Suppose now that C is consistent with the axioms and dene the asymmetric relation
 on X by x  y if C(fx; yg; ) = x. The relevant argument in the proof of Proposition
3 that establishes acyclicity of  from DEC, ReWARP and the full domain assumption is
valid here too. Hence,  is acyclic.
Next, let x 2 C(A; ). Repeated application of WPC eventually gives C(fx; yg; ) = x
and therefore x  y for some y 2 A. Moreover, if z  x for some z 2 A, then ReWARP is
violated. Hence, z  x for all z 2 A. Conversely, suppose (A; ) 2 Z is such that x  y for
some y 2 A and z  x for all z 2 A. Let A1 := fx; yg and label all elements of A other than
x and y by z2; : : : ; zk. For all i  2, dene Ai := fx; zig. We have C(A1; ) = x. Moreover,
in view of DEC and z  x for all z 2 A, we also have x 2 C(Ai; ) for all i = 2; : : : ; k. Since
A =
Sk
i=1Ai, it follows from AWEXP that x 2 C(A; ). This establishes (6b).
Now suppose x 2 C(A; s) and x 6= s. If C(fx; sg; s) 6= x, then FSQB is violated. Thus,
C(fx; sg; s) = x. CSI implies C(fx; sg; ) = x too, and therefore x  s. Now let z  x for
some z 2 A. Since x 2 C(A; s) and x 6= s, SQIC implies x 2 C(A; ). But since z  x
and z 2 A, this contradicts ReWARP. Conversely, suppose (A; s) 2 Z is such that x  s
and z  x for all z 2 A. By dening A1 := fx; sg and then repeating the AWEXP-based
argument in the previous paragraph one obtains x 2 C(A; s) and hence establishes (6c).
Finally, let (A; s) be such that z  s for all z 2 A. Suppose x 2 C(A; s) for some x 6= s.
It is implied by FSQB that C(fx; sg; s) = x, which, in view of CSI, contradicts z  s for all
z 2 A. Then, since it holds by construction that C(A; s) 6= ; for all (A; s) 2 Z, it follows
that C(A; s) = s. Conversely, suppose C(A; s) = s and assume that z  s for some z 2 A.
CSI implies C(fz; sg; s) = z, which, together with ReWARP, implies s 62 C(A; s). This
contradiction establishes (6d). 
Proof of Proposition 7
It is known from Propositions 4 and 6 that the axioms are necessary and sucient for
(7a){(7c) to hold with respect to an asymmetric (in the case of (7a)) and an acyclic (in
the case of (7b){(7c)) relation, respectively. It remains to be shown that under the stated
axioms the relation  dened by x  y if C(fx; yg; ) = x is acyclic.
Suppose not. There exist x1; x2; : : : ; xk 2 X such that x1  x2  : : :  xk  x1. Let
A := fx1; : : : ; xkg. Suppose xi 2 C(A; ) for some xi 2 A. Since xi 1  xi (or, if i = 1,
xk  x1), this contradicts ReWARP. Hence, C(A; ) = ;. Next, consider (A; xi) 2 Z for
some xi 2 A. By assumption, C(A; xi) 6= ;. Suppose xj 2 C(A; xi) for some xj 6= xi. Since
xj 62 C(A; ) = ;, this contradicts SQIC. Now suppose xi 2 C(A; xi). Since xi 1  xi, we
have C(fxi 1; xig; ) = xi 1 and, from CSI, C(fxi 1; xig; xi) = xi 1. Since xi 1 2 A, this
contradicts ReWARP. 
Proof of Proposition 8:
Suppose C : Z  X satises CSI, DEC, ReWARP, SPC and SQIC. Dene the relation
 as before, i.e. x  y if C(fx; yg; ) = x. We know from Proposition 5 that (8) holds for
all (A; ) 2 Z. By way of contradiction, let there be (A; s) 2 Z for which (8) does not hold.
Then, C(A; s) 6= fx 2 A : y  x for all y 2 Ag.
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By construction, C(A; s) 6= ;. Moreover, it is known from Proposition 5 that DEC,
ReWARP and SPC ensure that  is a strict linear order. Thus, there exists x 2 A such
that x  y for all y 2 A, x 6= y. Suppose s 2 C(A; s). It is true that y  s for some y 2 A.
In view of CSI, this implies C(fy; sg; s) = y. Since s 2 C(A; s) and y 2 A, this contradicts
ReWARP. Now suppose w 2 C(A; s) for some w 6= s. As before, y  w holds for some
y 2 A. It is implied by SQIC that w 2 C(A; ). Since y  w, ReWARP is contradicted.
This establishes that (8) holds for all (A; s) 2 Z as well.
Conversely, let there be a strict linear order  such that (8) holds. For all problems
(A; ) 2 Z with A 2 M we know from Proposition 5 that DEC, SPC and ReWARP are
satised. Suppose ReWARP is violated for a problem (A; s) with s 2 A. Then C(fx; sg; s) =
x for some x 2 A and C(A; s) = s. It follows from (8) and C(fx; sg; s) = x that x  s. It
also follows from (8) and C(A; s) = s that x  s, which is a contradiction. Thus, ReWARP
is satised for both types of problems. To show that C also obeys CSI consider x; y 2 X and
let C(fx; yg; ) = x and C(fx; yg; y) 6= x or C(fx; yg; y) = x and C(fx; yg; ) 6= x. Since
(8) holds, the rst statement in both cases implies x  y and the second implies x  y, a
contradiction. Finally, suppose C(A; s) = x for some x 6= s. It follows from (8) and the
fact that  is a strict linear order that x  y for all y 2 A, y 6= x. In view of (8) again,
C(A; ) = x too. Thus, C is also consistent with SQIC. 
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